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I. INTRODUCTION: ZACHARIAS AND A NEW PARADIGM
Abandoning a state-based system of attorney regulation for a national
and federal scheme has been a percolating question for the last twentyfive years. But the issue received its first in-depth scholarly treatment
by Professor Fred Zacharias in his 1994 seminal article, Federalizing
Legal Ethics.1 Professor Zacharias predicted that the increasing national
character of the legal profession would result in increased pressure to
create a uniform code of ethics.2 Against this pressure is the long
tradition of state-based regulation of the legal profession. As often was
the case, Zacharias was a prophet and led the way.3
In particular, he was quite right that the pressure toward a national
legal profession would continue unabated.4 The regulatory consequence,
however, has emerged in a somewhat unexpected form. Federalization
of legal ethics is occurring not through a tectonic shift but through a
more stealth, incremental approach. Rather than a conceptual, theoretical
shift away from state-based regulation, the legal profession has experienced
an increased regulatory contextualization of attorney conduct norms,
particularly in federal practice.5 This is sharply demonstrated by federal

1. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994).
2. See id. at 335.
3. “Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes . . . .”
23 Matthew 23:34 (King James). One was Zacharias. See id. at 23:35. What an appropriate
parallel to our wise Zacharias!
4. Professor Eli Wald explores this topic in greater detail in Eli Wald, Federalizing
Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American Legal
Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011).
5. Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, Federal Law of Attorney Conduct:
Court Practice, in 30 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 801.02–.05 (3d ed. 2010).
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agencies, which increasingly use their power to regulate practitioners to
create and enforce supplemental norms for attorneys. In this process, the
center of gravity of attorney regulation has continued to move toward an
increasing and complex web of federal regulation.6 This Article will
carry on Professor Zacharias’s profound insights and prophecies by
examining the trends in direct regulation of attorneys through federal
law, with a particular focus on expanding agency regulation. We will
also touch on international trends that draw on federal treaty obligations
to implement international norms of attorney conduct.
The seeds for federal regulation were sown by an unlikely body. The
American Bar Association (ABA) was formed in 1878 with the express
goal to identify the shared interests and serve as the national representative
of the legal profession.7 This collective, shared interest across state
boundaries, coupled with a strong resistance to federally imposed norms,
reflected the profession’s uneasy relationship with this state-federal
tension.8 As Professor Renee Knake noted in her analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2009 term cases involving lawyer conduct, the Supreme
Court has looked to the “ABA as the source of model guidelines for the

6. See generally Ingrid Epperly, Who’s Afraid of a Uniform Federal Court Bar?
Dispelling Fears About Standardizing Admission and Regulation of Attorneys in Federal
Courts, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 811, 812 (2009) (demonstrating that “standardization
of admissions and regulation in federal judicial courts will prove not only more costefficient for attorneys and clients, but also more effective as a method of maintaining
high ethical standards throughout the federal districts nationwide”); Peter A. Joy, The
Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis
Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765,
768 n.11 (2004) (cataloging a number of commentators who have described the current
regulatory scheme for lawyers as increasingly complex); Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11
and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959 (describing the shift from a
state-based system of self-regulation of attorney conduct to federal regulation based on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11); Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal
Professional Responsibility Rules: The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes,
6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 57 (2007) (analyzing the appropriate institutional
actors and appropriate considerations for the development of future professional
responsibility rules).
7. See EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
AND ITS WORK 3–4, 17–18 (1953); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BAR 562 (1911); see also About the American Bar Association, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.abanet.org/about/?gnav=global_about_lead (last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (“ABA
Mission: To serve equally our members, our profession and the public by defending
liberty and delivering justice as the national representative of the legal profession.”).
8. Professor Renee Knake explored the increasing constitutional dimensions of
lawyering in Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the
Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499 (2010).
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profession and as an advocate of practicing lawyers in filing amicus
curiae briefs.”9 The ABA, and state bar norms, which are typically
based on the ABA Model Rules, can serve as a source of national core
values.
But, ironically, the thrust of the movement toward federalization has
come not through federal articulation of national core values. That task
continues to be led by state bars and state regulatory apparatus, and the
ABA and the American Law Institute (ALI)10 as national entities.11 The
federal movement is to supplement, and occasionally change, the statebased vision to adapt to the needs of federal practice.12 This is
federalization through contextualization. If legal practice is shaped by a
hundred pokes of legal regulation, then for many lawyers an increasing
percentage of those pokes comes from federal law.13 Expanding federal
9. Id. at 1565.
10. The American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
(2000), as is typical of ALI Restatements, draws heavily on state rules and cases to
define national core values. See Daniel R. Coquillette, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS
4–9, 258–61 (2005).
11. The appropriateness of the ABA’s leadership has been challenged by Andrew
Kaufman, who would favor deferring instead to the Conference of Chief Justices and the
Judicial Conference of the United States. See Andrew L. Kaufman, Who Should Make
the Rules Governing Conduct of Lawyers in Federal Matters, 75 TUL. L. REV. 149, 157–
59 (2000). On several occasions, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference has considered adopting the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct,
but no actual rule proposals have been made. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., WORKING PAPERS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 223–34, 335–409 (1997);
McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at §§ 802.21–.23; see also Bruce A. Green,
Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and
How Should the Rules be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996). Whether the
Judicial Conference has the power to adopt federal rules directly regulating attorney
conduct under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2006), has been
challenged. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority To
Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003)
(identifying the different potential sources of regulatory authority and highlighting the
uncertainty of their reach). But these challenges may be literally academic in two ways:
(1) federal local rules already de facto directly regulate attorney conduct in federal
courts, and (2) when uniform federal rulemaking was being examined, bills were
introduced in Congress giving the Judicial Conference and its rules committees direct
congressional authority to adopt uniform Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct. See
McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at §§ 802.20–.23.
12. Other interesting proposals that could support this federalization trend include
Professor Carol Needham’s argument that all lawyers who have been admitted to a state
bar should be free to give advice on federal law. See Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar
Admission into Federal and State Components: National Admission for Advice on
Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453, 456 (1997). This would uncouple the requirement that
the advice be under the umbrella of agency authorization.
13. This phenomenon of expanded regulation from sources outside the bar has
been well developed by many commentators, including Professor Zacharias, whose work
is being honored in this memoriam. See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior:
The Sources and Uses of Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873
(2002); Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of
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law increases the range of criminal penalties to which lawyers are
subject. Lawyers involved in federal securities practice, immigration,
tax, patent, labor, and many other areas must be ever more attentive to
the regulatory power of the agencies before which they practice.14 These
agencies often focus on particular role concerns. Recently, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has focused on in-house counsel to
send signals about the advising role.15 The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has sharpened the tax lawyer’s obligation when advising on tax
shelters to prevent the abuse of lawyer services.16 Immigration has
given a particular emphasis on the lawyer’s role in not facilitating sham
marriages,17 and the patent office continues to send signals about the
importance of full and accurate disclosure.18
Many have noted the increasing emphasis on the lawyer as gatekeeper.19
Although much passion and attention was directed to the SEC efforts to
increase the gatekeeper role, other agencies were sharpening that vision
of lawyer conduct and enhancing the gatekeeper role within the needs of
the particular institutional setting.
This contextualization of practice also gives fertile ground for continued
research about institutional choices and competency in regulating
attorneys.20 This regulatory approach allows for agency perspectives to
be reflected in the law of lawyering. This, of course, has some challenges,
including concern of capture, unease if the regulatory approach involves
opposing counsel having the power to institute professional sanctions,
and inconsistencies of the regulatory approach with core values.
Although occasional conflicts and tensions occur, our robust experience
with federalism provides a mechanism to work through those differences. It
is not merely using the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to
declare that federal regulation trump state rules. A more complex

Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559 (2005); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self
Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.B(1).
16. See infra Part II.B(3).
17. See infra Part II.B(2).
18. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009); Hymel, supra note 13, at 903–04; infra Part
II.B(4).
19. See Knake, supra note 8, at 1560–64.
20. See generally Symposium, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996) (discussing the question of who should regulate lawyers).
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conversation occurs between and among these various interests to discuss
and harmonize (eventually) the varying perspectives.
II. FEDERALIZATION: TAKING STOCK
Federalization of legal ethics has come from four different methods,
each lending wind to the sails of federalization.
A. Substantive Federal Statutes and the Rules Enabling Act as
Regulating Attorneys: Some Examples
One trend toward federalization comes from the application of generally
applicable federal substantive law to lawyering activities, shifting the
risk-management assessment of lawyers.21 Lawyers have always been
subject to generally applicable laws, both federal and state, and our legal
history is dotted with examples of use of those provisions against
attorneys. Criminal law is a prime example. Clarence Darrow was charged
and acquitted of bribing a juror, with a second trial ending in a hung
jury.22 Howe and Hummell were infamous legends in the New York bar
at the turn of the century before the firm imploded after Hummel’s
conspiracy conviction.23 As Professor Bruce Green notes, criminal law
can both establish standards of conduct for lawyers and influence the
development of disciplinary standards.24
With the rapidly increasing volume of federal law, it is almost
inevitable that there will be a corresponding increase in application of
that federal law to lawyers.25 The possibilities are expansive. Conspiracy
21. For an interesting discussion of risk management in law, see Anthony V.
Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909
(2006); and Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV.
73 (2001).
22. See GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW: THE BRIBERY
TRIAL OF AMERICA’S GREATEST LAWYER 433 (1993).
23. CAIT MURPHY, SCOUNDRELS IN LAW: THE TRIALS OF HOWE & HUMMEL,
LAWYERS TO THE GANGSTERS, COPS, STARLETS, AND RAKES WHO MADE THE GILDED AGE
247–48, 262–67 (2010).
24. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 327, 343 (1998); see also Bruce A. Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the
Edge: A Look Back, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 353, 353 (2007) (detailing the story of John
Palmieri’s defense of John J. Delane in the year 1915, the subsequent debate over Palmieri’s
conduct during the trial, and “efforts to locate a line between a permissibly zealous defense
and an improperly overzealous one”).
25. The Duke Conference of May 10–11, 2010, sponsored by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, included extensive discussion of expanded attorney
regulation to prevent discovery abuse, particularly spoliation of electronic evidence. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION § III(B) (2010) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CHIEF
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and obstruction of justice loom in the background.26 Charges of making
false statements to the government and perjury are risks for those who
either intentionally lie or fool themselves into unsupportable factual
distinctions.27 Federal bankruptcy law prohibiting any person from
“knowingly and fraudulently mak[ing] false declarations” was the basis
for a criminal prosecution of Milbank Tweed partner John Gellene,
whose story is told with riveting effect in Professor Milton Regan’s book
Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer.28 Class action law
firms have been indicted for sharing fees with clients.29 Lawyer Lynne
Stuart was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by
violating the special administrative measures imposed on her client.30
Immigration lawyers have been criminally charged for engaging in
immigration fraud, particularly in the sham marriage area.31 Deliberate
ignorance in the face of client criminal conduct is risky behavior for a
lawyer.32 And criminal contempt can be brought against lawyers for
conduct deemed to interfere with the administration of justice.33
Although not targeting the lawyers for criminal conduct, in criminal
investigations against corporate clients, the Department of Justice has, in

JUSTICE]. But whether the Conference will result in new federal rules remains to be
seen.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 1998) (“If
lawyers are not punished for their criminal conduct and corrupt endeavors to manipulate
the administration of justice, the result would be the same: the weakening of an ethical
adversarial system and the undermining of just administration of the law.”); United States
v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving a lawyer who was convicted of
conspiracy to obstruct justice).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Baum, 32 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
28. United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 585–86 (7th Cir. 1999) (criminal
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)); MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU
KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004).
29. See Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 159 (2008).
30. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 108 (2d Cir. 2009). For a very
interesting analysis of issues raised by lawyer solidarity with one’s client, see Peter
Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for
Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos Algarin, 584 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1978).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1505 (6th Cir. 1992)
(overturning wiretap conviction of a lawyer who used tapes made by the client, and
noting that “[a]lthough an attorney must not turn a blind eye to the obvious, he should be
able to give his clients the benefit of the doubt”).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1339–41 (9th Cir. 1981).
In obstruction of justice enforcement, there is a safe harbor for a bona fide legal defense,
but it is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by the defendant. See
United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 948–49 (11th Cir. 2001).
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the words of one commentator, “a trend towards using the criminal law
and the government’s investigatory tools against lawyers because of
what appears to be a deep-seated suspicion of legal advice as something
harmful or inappropriate.”34 And some have urged criminalization of the
legal advice given by lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel concerning
the legality of torture.35
Civil actions have also swept up attorneys into the fray. The savings
and loan crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated civil
enforcement actions by the Office of Thrift Counsel against attorneys.36
Subsequent malpractice actions for violation of federal standards helped
reshape the expectations in this area of practice as well.37 Aiding and
abetting liability lurks in the background as a possible theory.38
Similarly, the SEC has been aggressive in bringing actions against
attorneys. SEC Chair Christopher Cox publicly stated in 2007 that
“[i]t’s because the roles of gatekeeper and watchdog come with a great
deal of responsibility that, when professionals—lawyers or accountants
—fail to live up to their responsibility, the Commission will bring
enforcement actions.”39 The SEC has brought actions against attorneys
for backdating and insider trading, and for failing to engage in a

34. Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 674 (2005).
35. See Julian Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dangerous Campaign To Criminalize
Good Faith Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2009).
36. See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 988–
89 (1993); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor
and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 244
(1998).
37. See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary
Visions of Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 97 (2008); Anthony E.
Davis, The Long-Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law Firm
Management—Risk Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 677, 678, 681
(1994); Susan M. Freeman, Are DIP and Committee Counsel Fiduciaries for Their
Clients’ Constituents or the Bankruptcy Estate? What Is a Fiduciary, Anyway?, 17 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 291, 362 & n.332, 381 n.417 (2009); John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics
Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 973–78 (2009); Meredith E. Level, Note, Do the
Shoes Fit? Creating Federal Common Law in Legal Malpractice Cases When a Banking
Regulator Is a Party, 23 STETSON L. REV. 893, 902–03 (1994).
38. See generally SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a
lawyer’s conviction of aiding and abetting securities violations justified permanent
injunction against future violations); Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and
Abetting: Should Lawyers Be “Privileged” To Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29
PACE L. REV. 75 (2008) (analyzing state law claims primarily).
39. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the 2007
Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8, 2007), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807
cc.htm. There have been similar initiatives in the past. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm’r,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address Before the Banking Corporation and Business Law
Section of the New York State Bar Association: The Emerging Responsibilities of the
Securities Lawyer (Jan. 24, 1974), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/012474sommer.pdf.
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reasonable investigation before issuing an opinion that bonds would be
tax exempt.40 In recent years, the SEC has gone after general counsel in
particular.41 Some efforts were more successful than others, but the
legal profession has taken note of the effort.42
A growing body of statutory and procedural provisions also shapes the
attorney-client relationship in targeted areas. Congress has limited the
use of legal services money, prohibiting class actions, attorneys’ fees
and imposing other restrictions.43 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) prohibits lawyers,
who are debt relief agents within the meaning of the Act, from advising
clients to take on more debt before filing for bankruptcy.44 Class action
representation has been reshaped by both legislation and changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, acting pursuant to congressional
authority under the Rules Enabling Act,45 the Judicial Conference of the
United States has directly regulated attorney conduct in filing frivolous
actions,46 in representing class plaintiffs,47 and in spoliation of evidence.48
Recent proposals growing out of the 2010 Duke Conference on Civil
Procedure, now pending before the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
could include greater attorney regulation in regard to spoliation of
40. See, e.g., Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
41. See generally W. Hardy Callcott & Abigail C. Slonecker, A Review of Recent
SEC Actions Against Lawyers, 42 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 71, 77–78 (2009),
available at http://www.bingham.com/ExternalObjects/Docs/Callcott_Slonecker_RSCR_318-09_(4152).pdf (“In over a third of the investigations that resulted in SEC enforcement
actions, in-house counsel for the issuers were charged with violations. The issuers’
outside counsel were not charged in any of these cases, although the SEC investigated
some outside counsel.” (footnote omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Fehn, 97 F.3d at 1276; SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546
F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 687
(D.D.C. 1978) (holding that although defendants violated the securities laws, the
injunction was denied because the SEC did not establish that defendants would violate
securities laws in the future).
43. See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke
the Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by
Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 874 (2002); Ilisabeth Smith
Bornstein, Comment, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of
the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 693, 693.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2006).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
47. Id. 23.
48. Id. 26.
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electronic evidence.49 Although we should not overemphasize these
statutory and rulemaking provisions, federal law and federal liability
play an important role in shaping one or more norms of attorney conduct.
B. Federal Agency Authority and Regulating Attorneys
Most federal agencies play a dominant role in specialty areas of law,
and many of these agencies directly regulate the conduct of attorneys
who appear before them. Several factors support this independent
agency regulation. In many contexts, such as patent, labor, and tax, both
lawyers and authorized nonlawyer practitioners can represent clients
before the agency.50 In these “mixed-profession” settings, “there is a
clear need for some form of ethical regulation beyond that provided by
the individual professional organizations.”51
Representation before agencies also involves particular practice
context, so that agency-level regulation tailors the professional
regulation to reflect the unique aspects of the practice setting.52 This is
an example of the context-driven, middle-level approach advocated by
Professor David Wilkins in Legal Realism for Lawyers.53
Agency practice also provides a rich context in which the public
interest can be identified with greater specificity. For example, whether
imposing a gatekeeper role is good or bad policy requires us to
understand the role lawyers play within a particular context. What might
be quite tolerable in an advisory capacity might be much less tolerable in
a litigation setting.54
Representation before agencies also typically puts a premium on
specialized knowledge of the attorneys. That offers advantages to repeat
actors, who may have an incentive to curry favor with the agency.55
49. See REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 25.
50. See infra Part II.B
51. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 6
(4th ed. 2008) (“It is important that there be uniform standards for the various
professionals to the extent that they perform identical services in the tax market.”).
52. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 829, 841 (2002) (“The assumptions that all lawyers and all clients are the same
have led to perhaps the most dramatic delusion inherent in the modern professional
codes; namely, that a single set of rules should apply equally to, and can adequately govern,
all legal representation.”).
53. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468
(1990).
54. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for
the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1293–95 (2003).
55. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1995) (“[T]he
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Because of the fluid movement between the public and private sector,
there is also concern about the corrosive effect on public officials who
may be seeking lucrative future jobs with the lawyers who appear before
the agency.56 Although federal conflict-of-interest laws address common
concerns among the federal agencies, these issues can be fine-tuned by
agency-level regulations.57
This knowledge-specific environment also has risks. There is a
concern of capture, so that “opponents (especially repeat players) have a
variety of incentives to enlist” attorney conduct mechanisms “to advance
their own goals.”58 Allowing agencies the power to regulate lawyers
who are sometimes their adversaries in a litigation context could also be
used to unduly pressure opposing counsel or drive a wedge between the
attorney and client.59
In a quest for more context for these generalities, set out below is a
brief description of six federal agency systems that regulate the conduct
of attorneys who appear before the agency. One or two instances of
agency regulation might be an anomaly. The multiple federal agencies
that regulate attorneys indicate a trend.
1. Corporate Lawyers and the Securities and
Exchange Commission
The SEC’s expanded regulation of attorneys has received extensive
commentary in the last decade.60 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act clarified the
SEC’s authority to regulate attorneys, and the SEC has taken that

importance to clients of hiring lawyers with expertise and a proven track record in
representing clients before particular regulatory agencies creates a situation in which
lawyers representing clients before agencies easily are ‘captured’ by the agencies before
whom they practice.”).
56. Our thanks to Professor Renee Jones of Boston College Law School, who is
currently researching this topic.
57. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 402 (2006); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201–227 (2006).
58. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2002).
59. See Julie Andersen Hill, Divide and Conquer: SEC Discipline of Litigation
Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 373, 373 (2009).
60. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at § 815; Peter J. Henning,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better To Prevent Corporate
Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323 (2004); Hill, supra note 59.
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authority to heart.61 SEC Rule 102(e) provides authority to discipline
attorneys who lack the “requisite qualifications to represent others,”
“character or integrity,” or who have “engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct,” or “willfully violated, or willfully aided and
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or
the rules and regulations thereunder.”62
The SEC regulation of attorneys emerges in three distinct ways. First,
as addressed above, the SEC has aggressively pursued some lawyers for
securities violations. In particular, the SEC has pursued in-house counsel
for backdating options, charging those attorneys with primary violations
of the securities law. In some instances the lawyer violated securities
laws as a private actor. But in other circumstances the SEC was
challenging the lawyer for lawyering activity.63
The second form of SEC regulation occurs through rule 102(e)
proceedings, or closely related obligations imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley
and the regulations under it, against counsel who assist in transactional
activities. These rule 102(e) proceedings can be closely linked to
primary securities violations. A primary violation will result in an
exclusion from practice before the SEC under rule 102(e), so those
enforcement decisions obviously have a profound effect on the attorneyclient relationship. Both the underlying substantive allegation and the
professional sanction under rule 102(e) can be resolved during a
settlement in which the attorney admits to the securities violation and
agrees to be suspended from practice.64 The scope of the willful violation
provision is enhanced by the Commission’s view that willful means only
that the respondent intentionally committed the act that was found to
have violated the securities laws.65
A third body of cases sanction attorneys for litigation misconduct.
This poses an interesting conceptual challenge because the SEC is on
one side of the litigation and is sanctioning an opposing counsel. As
Professor Julie Andersen Hill notes, this raises some significant
theoretical concerns about potential abuse.66
61. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in
the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2010).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1) (2010).
63. See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. See, e.g., James A Fitzhenry, Exchange Act Release No. 46,870, Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1670 (Nov. 21, 2002) (five-year suspension by
consent); Craig Scott, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,077 (Feb. 14, 2005) (three-year
suspension by consent).
65. J. WILLIAM HICKS, 17 CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION
UNDER THE 1933 ACT § 2:115 (2010).
66. Hill, supra note 59.
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2. Immigration Lawyers and the Executive Office of
Immigration Review
Immigration practitioners, both attorneys and nonattorneys, have also
experienced an increased regulation of their conduct. The Executive
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), a federal agency under the
Department of Justice that oversees immigration courts, has the authority
to determine both who may practice and the norms of conduct.67 In June
2000, the EOIR, in conjunction with the now defunct Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), strengthened and clarified the Rules and
Procedures for Professional Conduct for Practitioners. The EOIR
regulations subdivided the power to regulate based on the context within
the immigration system, separating appearance before adjudicative
bodies, for example, asylum proceedings and adjustment interviews, and
separately authorized the EOIR to engage in similar investigations for
issues in appearances before the board and immigration courts.68
Amended again in December 2008, the strengthened regulations focus in
particular on issues of neglect by practitioners—failure to abide by client
instructions, lack of reasonable diligence, competence and promptness,
and failure to stay in contact with clients—and lack of candor before the
EOIR tribunals.69 One goal of the 2008 amendments was to make the
EOIR’s professional conduct regulations “more consistent with the
ethical standards applicable in most states and the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”70
The EOIR is not shy about establishing and publishing these norms.
A link to the list of disciplined practitioners and the most recent
disciplinary actions appear on the homepage of its website.71 Over 400
names appear on the list of disciplined practitioners.
The regulations give adjudicating officials of the immigration court
and the Board of Immigration Appeals the authority to sanction “any

67. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 (2010). See EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 15–30, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPrac
Manual/Chap%202.pdf.
68. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3, 292 (2010); 65 Fed. Reg. 39,513 (June 27, 2000).
69. News Release, Exec. Office of Immigration Review, EOIR Implements
Regulation To Enhance Attorney Discipline Program (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AttyDiscReg010609.pdf.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. List of Disciplined Practitioners, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last updated July 9, 2010).
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practitioner[,] if it finds it to be in the public interest to do so.”72 It
appears that a significant majority of those actions are instances of
reciprocal discipline, in which the EOIR is adopting the recommended
discipline from the state bar.73 Even with a heavy focus on reciprocal
discipline, there is an edginess to seeing a list of more than 400 lawyers
and practitioners listed in such a public and prominent fashion. This
public presentation supports the EOIR’s goal of protecting vulnerable
clients from incompetent or unethical practitioners. It also has the effect
of sending a signal to immigration practitioners that the EOIR is monitoring
lawyering conduct.
3. Tax Lawyers and the Treasury Department
Tax attorneys have long understood that their ethical obligations are
determined heavily by federal law and norms of practice before the tax
courts. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by federal statute to
regulate the practice of representative practitioners.74 The Treasury
Department regulations, known as Circular 230, govern tax practitioners,
both lawyers and nonlawyers.75 Circular 230 is a substantial set of
regulations that establishes an Office of Professional Responsibility and
sets out who may practice.76 Circular 230 also sets out particular duties
and restrictions in practice before the IRS, including circumstances when
the lawyer has knowledge of a client’s omission,77 obligations to
exercise due diligence,78 practice by former government employees or
their partners and associates,79 fees,80 return of client records,81 conflicts
of interest,82 solicitation,83 and standards for advising with respect to tax
returns,84 among other topics. The Circular gives special attention to
issues of “[i]ncompetence and disreputable conduct.”85 Anyone who has

72. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101(a) (2010).
73. We have begun an empirical examination of this database, which hopefully will
provide more insights into the pattern of disciplinary actions by the EOIR.
74. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2006).
75. 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2010). For an early history of Circular 230, see Dennis J.
Ventry Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury’s 1986 Circular 230 Proposal, 112 TAX
NOTES 691 (2006).
76. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.1–.8 (2010).
77. Id. § 10.21.
78. Id. § 10.22.
79. Id. § 10.25.
80. Id. § 10.27.
81. Id. § 10.28.
82. Id. § 10.29.
83. Id. § 10.30.
84. Id. § 10.34.
85. Id. § 10.51.
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corresponded by e-mail with a tax lawyer has seen the standard Circular
230 disclaimer at the end of the e-mail.
In the early 1980s government officials threatened government action
if the bar did not take action to establish professional standards in tax
shelter opinions.86 Both the bar and IRS would take action.87 By the
mid-1980s tax practitioners began noting that “professional standards in
the tax marketplace are undergoing dramatic change.”88 Circular 230
has been amended over time to strengthen the obligations of tax attorneys,
including the 2004 amendments to impose stronger due diligence
requirements on tax attorneys who provide tax shelter advice.89 More
recent congressional and Treasury action now requires that the advice
position have a “more likely than not” chance of succeeding on the
merits, and if not, the position must be disclosed to the IRS.90 The IRS
has also clarified the underlying standards for tax shelters, creating a
flurry of legal commentary on the content of the legal rules.91 But a dual
track of regulating both the content of the rules applied to the taxpayers
and those who assist clients in applying the rules, namely, tax practitioners,
increases the chance of compliance.
As with all regulations, the real question is whether these attorney
conduct norms have meaning in the lives of tax lawyers. The enhanced
standards for tax shelter advice have continued to draw the attention of
practitioners, with a flurry of articles and practice commentary.92 As a
tax attorney, it would be hard to ignore the enforcement actions of the
IRS against attorneys. In 2005, the law firm of Jenkins & Gilchrist
closed after admitting that it owed a penalty of $76 million to the IRS for

86. James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions
314, 346 and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 217 (1985).
87. Id. at 217–18.
88. Id. at 209.
89. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax
Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 79, 95–97 (2006).
90. See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters,
24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 31 (2004).
91. See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation
Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006); Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter
Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267
(2008).
92. See David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to
Others—The Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty
to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009).
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abusive and fraudulent tax shelters.93 The IRS public statement
accompanying that announcement declared that “[p]ursuing abusive tax
shelters is a top priority for the IRS.”94 Tax attorneys risk a civil
preparer penalty for understatement of liability or claim for a refund
when there was not a reasonable belief or basis for the position taken.95
No one would be surprised to learn that submitting false or misleading
information in connection to with a client’s return can result in
suspension from practice.96 And a tax attorney who fails to file her own
tax return is at serious risk of being barred from practice before the
IRS.97
Of course, formal agency sanctions are not the only concern. Highprofile investigations by Congress or the IRS can be both embarrassing
and time-consuming. The IRS has also entered into public settlement
agreements that publicize investigations, creating a public reprimand.
For example, in 2007 the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) announced a settlement with two attorneys concerning a municipal
bond issuance. 98 The OPR had alleged inadequate due diligence.99
The attorneys settled by agreement to comply fully with practices
implemented by their current firm in its public finance group.100
93. I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-news/ir-07-071.pdf (“‘[T]his should be a lesson to all tax professionals that
they must not aid or abet tax evasion by clients or promote potentially abusive or illegal
tax shelters, or ignore their responsibilities to register or disclose tax shelters . . . .’”).
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
95. See 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2009). For examples of enforcement of
this provision, see Goulding v. United States, 957 F.2d 1420, 1423–24 (7th Cir. 1992),
which states, “Section 6694 of the Internal Revenue Code penalizes income tax return
preparers for understatements of taxpayer’s liability which result from negligent
disregard of rules and regulations by the return preparer or from [willful] attempts by the
return preparer to understate the tax due.” Section 6694(b) imposes a separate penalty
for “willful attempt” to understate liability or a “reckless or intentional disregard of rules
and regulations.” See 26 U.S.C. § 6694(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2009). This preparer penalty is
subject to limitations that it does not apply if the preparer had reasonable cause for the
understatement and the preparer acted in good faith. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note
51, at 105; see also I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282; T.D. 9436, 2009-3 I.R.B.
268.
96. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-19 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.
unclefed.com/Tax-News/2010/nr10-19.html.
97. See, e.g., Owrutsky v. Brady, No. 89-2402, 1991 WL 18156, at *1 (4th Cir.
Feb. 19, 1991) (holding attorney who failed to file tax returns disbarred from practice
before IRS for voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, even though the
attorney was eligible for refunds); I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-27 (Mar. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-News/2010/nr10-27.html (discussing attorney
barred from practice before the IRS for forty-eight months for failure to file one federal
tax return and filing another five returns late).
98. I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-197 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.
unclefed.com/Tax-News/2007/nr07-197.html.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Perhaps the most effective sanction is a successful malpractice action.
Tax lawyers should be particularly attentive to the malpractice
implications if violating agency norms causes harm to the client. As
Professor Jay Soled has noted, “taxpayers who invested in failed tax
shelters have brought an avalanche of malpractice cases against their
advising lawyers and accountants.”101 Both the temptations and the
punishments can be severe in the extraordinary context of tax practice.
In this world of tax conduct, there is relatively little discussion of bar
disciplinary actions. The regulation in this area is dominated by tax
court norms and malpractice. The ABA as a source of norms, however,
appears to have been influential in the dialectic between congressional
and agency action and bar norms.102
4. Intellectual Property Lawyers and the Patent and
Trademark Office
Congress has expressly authorized the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) to regulate attorneys and agents who appear before it.103
The USPTO has a dedicated Office of Enrollment and Discipline
(OED).104 Although the practice in trademark cases is generally open
only to licensed attorneys, the patent office has a fully developed
alternative practice scheme that closely parallels state bars.105 The
USPTO requires that practitioners pass a registration exam, commonly
known as the Patent Bar, and demonstrate “good moral character and
reputation.”106 Patent practitioners include both attorneys and nonattorneys,
who are known as patent agents.107 All practitioners appearing before
the USPTO, whether attorneys or patent agents, must comply with the

101. Soled, supra note 91, at 268.
102. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 14–16.
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
104. See Laura Heyne, The Disciplinary Function of the PTO’s Office of General
Counsel, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65, 65 (2010); Office of Enrollment and Discipline:
OED Responsibilities, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about/
offices/ogc/oed.jsp (Aug. 26, 2010, 2:23 PM).
105. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.14 (2010); Trademark FAQs, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#Other005 (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
106. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7 (2010).
107. Id. § 11.1.
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Patent and Trademark Office Code of Professional Conduct, which is
based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.108
The Patent and Trademark Office has a well-developed system to both
investigate and bring action against patent practitioners who violate the
USPTO Code of Professional Conduct, are convicted of a serious crime,
have been disciplined by another jurisdiction or other federal agency, or
have violated any oaths of office.109 As with Board of Immigration
Appeals, much of the focus of the USPTO disciplinary process is on
reciprocal discipline.110 Violations that are uniquely tailored to patent
practice include backdating correspondence to the USPTO, abandoning
patent applications, deceptive advertising, and withholding from the
patent examiner known information about prior art.111
This latter point of withholding known information is a particular
concern to the USPTO because its Rules of Practice impose a higher
duty of disclosure, candor, and good faith on individuals who file and
prosecute patent applications.112 This flows from the nature of the legal
right given in the patent context. It is not an adversarial proceeding but
a government grant of exclusive rights, which imposes a legal duty of
full disclosure as a condition to the right.113 The patent system depends
on this higher level of disclosure than we typically see in other legal
contexts.114
As with immigration, the USPTO Office of Enrollment and Discipline
makes its final decisions available online. The office lists 202 reported
discipline matters as of December 2010.115 The most serious sanction of
exclusion from practice appears to be reserved for instances in which the
practitioner was convicted of a crime and has already been disciplined
by the practitioner’s state bar.116
108. See David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
261, 265 (2007); William J. Jacob, Professional Ethics Before the USPTO: A Discussion
for Beginners, 16 P ROF . L AW ., no.2, 2005 at 22, 22; see generally 37 C.F.R.
§§ 10.2–.112 (2010).
109. 37 C.F.R. § 11.19(b)(1)(i)–(v) (2010) (grounds for discipline). The disciplinary
process is set out in id. § 11.24.
110. See Heyne, supra note 104, at 67.
111. See id. at 69.
112. 37 C.F.R § 1.56(a) (2010).
113. See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 31:63–:65 (4th ed. 2010).
114. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“The highest standards
of honesty and candor on the part of applicants in presenting such facts to the office are
thus necessary elements in a working patent system.”).
115. Decisions of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline, U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/DispatchOEDServlet?decisionType=Discipline&
contractNo=&respName=&txtInput_StartDate=&txtInput_EndDate=&docTextSearch=&p
age=9999999 (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
116. Heyne, supra note 104, at 69.
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5. Veterans’ Lawyers and the Veterans Benefits Administration
The Veterans Benefits Administration came late to the issue of
authorizing representatives. Until 2008, it was a crime to accept more
than $10 to represent a person with a VA claim, which obviously shut
down any system of paid representation.117 The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of this exclusion in 1985 when the Court
deferred to congressional intent to make the proceedings informal and
nonadversarial, and to ensure that the veteran would not have to share
the benefit award with attorneys.118 This prohibition was amended in the
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, which now allows attorneys fees under
specific circumstances but largely prevents attorney involvement until a
notice of disagreement is filed, which generally occurs after the record is
set.119
Paid representation is now allowed beginning at the second stage of
review. A “Notice of Disagreement” triggers a review at the VA Regional
Office, which can be formally appealed to the Board of Veteran Appeals
(BVA).120 The BVA findings may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims.121
The Veterans Administration also sets out procedures for the designation
of authorized representatives.122 Both attorneys and nonattorneys may
be designated as representatives.123
Continued restrictions on when attorneys may receive compensation
may be one reason why the veterans bar is comparatively small. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims lists about 700 practitioners

117. The $10 limit appeared at 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (2006). See generally Barton F.
Stichman, Advocating Benefits for Veterans, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 256 (2009).
118. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321–26
(1985), superseded by statute, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102
Stat. 4105 (1988).
119. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
For a fuller description of the current provision, see Matthew J. Dowd, No Claim
Adjudication Without Representation: A Criticism of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c), 16 FED. CIR.
B.J. 53, 60–64 (2007); and Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying
Disabled Veterans the Freedom To Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 441–43
(2009).
120. See Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that Veterans
Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1160–61 (2010).
121. Id. at 1161.
122. 38 C.F.R. § 14.630 (2010).
123. Id.
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approved for practice before the court.124 This is a relatively small
number given the high caseload.125 Even with this relatively small bar,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims maintains a link to
publicly identify disciplined attorneys, setting out links for disbarred
attorneys, two-year suspensions, and reciprocal suspensions.126 The
published content is slender, however, with no attorneys disbarred or
suspended, and two receiving reciprocal discipline. One inference,
perhaps premature, is that the role of attorneys is sufficiently hampered
that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims does not need to focus on
attorney misconduct. And as with other areas of law, it is relatively rare
that an administrative action to suspend an attorney from practice
reaches the courts.127
6. Labor Lawyers and the National Labor Relations Board
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulations state that
“[a]ny attorney or other representative appearing or practicing before the
Agency shall conform to the standards of ethical and professional
conduct required of practitioners before the courts.”128 The NLRB is
authorized to discipline an attorney or representative “at any stage of any
Agency proceeding.”129 The regulations establish a procedure, with
initial investigation by the Associate General Counsel, Division of
Operations-Management, or the Associate General Counsel’s designee,
as the investigating officer.130
Lawyers practicing before the NLRB have been disciplined under this
process for a variety of conduct. For example, a lawyer was reprimanded
and reported to the state bar for failure to comply with applicable rules
concerning conflicts of interest and failing to factually investigate
124. Public List of Practitioners, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS,
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/practitioners/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010); see also Wright,
supra note 119, at 446.
125. See Wright, supra note 119, at 439.
126. Disciplined Attorneys, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.
uscourts.cavc.gov/practitioners/DisciplinaryAction.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
127. See, e.g., Malik v. Shinseki, No. 10-233, 2010 WL 1252254, at *1 (U.S. App.
Vet. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying a petition for writ of mandamus because “[t]he petitioner’s
accreditation to represent claimants before [the] VA was cancelled . . . on the grounds
that the petitioner had knowingly presented false information to [the] VA and had accepted
unlawful compensation for representing claimants before [the] VA”).
128. 29 C.F.R. § 102.177(a) (2010).
129. Id. § 102.177(d) (“Misconduct by an attorney or other representative at any
stage of any Agency proceeding, including but not limited to misconduct at a hearing,
shall be grounds for discipline. Such misconduct of an aggravated character shall be
grounds for suspension and/or disbarment from practice before the Agency and/or other
sanctions.”).
130. Id. § 102.177(e)(1).
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submissions.131 Lawyers have been suspended for a pattern of misconduct,
such as engaging in ad hominem comments, misuse of affidavits, racial
slurs, misrepresentations and obstruction, and delay of the hearing.132
Not surprisingly, physical violence will result in a suspension from
practice.133 Nonattorney representatives have also been sanctioned
under this provision.134
It is somewhat more complicated when lawyers or representatives
engage in misconduct during an NLRB hearing. In some cases, the
board has been more rigorous in requiring that a formal section
102.177(d) hearing be instituted. 135 In other circumstances, an
administrative law judge has been allowed to immediately sanction an
attorney, including excluding an attorney for cumulative inappropriate
conduct and false and misleading testimony.136 An attorney might be
warned during a hearing that future conduct may warrant referral to the
investigating officer for possible disciplinary action.137
As important as formal authority is the NLRB’s desire to focus on the
issue. The NLRB General Counsel’s office has explored whether to
engage in more rulemaking concerning attorney conduct in labor
practice.138 At this time, however, the attorney conduct regulation at the
NLRB is not as aggressive as other federal agencies.
7. All Agencies: An Amorphous Definition of the Practice of Law
A federal perspective has offered one interesting twist on the traditional
notions of self-regulation. These federal agencies are much less
persuaded by concerns for unauthorized practice of law. Many agencies
are granted express authority to determine who may practice—and allow
131. See, e.g., Simpson, 347 N.L.R.B. 883 (2006) (reprimand and referral to bar).
132. See, e.g., Keiler, 316 N.L.R.B. 763 (1995).
133. See, e.g., Murphy, 338 N.L.R.B. 769 (2002) (responding to allegation that
respondent struck decertification petitioner in face during a Board-conducted decertification
election).
134. See, e.g., Einy, 352 N.L.R.B.1178 (2008).
135. See, e.g., Mail Contractors of Am., 347 N.L.R.B. 1158, 1159 (2006) (agreeing
that published reprimand in written opinion constitutes a sanction that requires section
102.177 procedures).
136. See, e.g., USA Remediation Servs., Inc., No. 5-CA-31524, 2006 N.L.R.B. LEXIS
89 (Mar. 15, 2006).
137. See, e.g., McAllister Towing & Transp. Co., 341 N.L.R.B. 394, 427 (2004).
138. See LORI W. KETCHAM, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., LEGAL ETHICS AT THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/labor/
dlcomm/mw/papers/2009/papers/mw-m.pdf.
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for nonlawyer practitioners—including patent,139 tax,140 immigration,141
and labor.142 Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal agency decisions
override state regulations, so that a state cannot prohibit the federal
practice by nonattorneys.143 Lawyers and nonlawyers have provided
services in these contexts side-by-side with relatively little controversy.
Despite this experience, both the American Bar Association and state
regulatory systems continue to pursue a policy of strengthening legal
norms to bar unauthorized practice.144 These efforts suffered a blow in
2002, when the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice
of Law proposed a definition for public discussion.145 The proposed
definition was challenged by the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission, which expressed concern that the Model Definition
was overly broad and likely to hurt consumers.146 These concerns reflect
the 1984 challenges by the Department of Justice to state bar association
agreements with the banking industry.147 This agency experience with
shared practice is an important datum point in the debate about
unauthorized practice.

139. 35 U.S.C. § 31 (2006).
140. Id. § 330 (setting out authority to regulate the practice of representatives of persons
before the Department of the Treasury).
141. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 (2010).
142. 29 C.F.R. § 18.34(g) (2009).
143. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963)
(“Florida may not deny [petitioner] the right to perform the functions within the scope of
the federal authority.”).
144. See Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law: Challenge
Statement, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_challenge.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (noting the growing gray area where nonlawyers provide
services that are difficult to characterize “as being, or not being, the delivery of legal
services,” which may be partly responsible for “spotty enforcement of unauthorized
practice of law statutes across the nation and arguably an increasing number of attendant
problems related to the delivery of services by nonlawyers”).
145. See John Gibeaut, Another Try: ABA Task Force Takes a Shot at Defining the
Practice of Law, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 18.
146. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n to Members of
the Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Am. Bar Ass’n (Dec. 20,
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/ftc.pdf (“[T]he DOJ and the
FTC believe that consumers generally benefit from lawyer-nonlawyer competition in the
provision of certain services. . . . We conclude that the proposed definition is not in the
public interest because the harms it imposes on consumers by limiting competition are
likely much greater than any consumer harm that it prevents.”).
147. Id.; see also ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 443–49
(3d ed. 1996); COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, NONLAWYER
ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS (1995).
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C. Federal Litigation Norms
Litigation norms have long been established primarily by the courts,
not the state regulatory apparatus. Of course, almost all American
judges have come through the common training ground of national
American law schools and have been inculcated in the common values
of the legal profession. But fine-tuning those values in the context of
litigation has been left to the courts. Federal courts have established a
fairly wide body of doctrine on attorney conduct.148 Through the
Federal Rules Enabling Act the courts have embraced the power to make
rules on attorney conduct.149 And case-by-case adjudication has resulted
in a rich body of doctrine addressing conflicts of interest, confidentiality,
contact with represented persons, and the like. The conflicts doctrine
developed by federal courts has been particularly influential in creating
understandings of appropriate behavior in the litigation context.
Bankruptcy courts offer another interesting example. Ethical issues in
bankruptcy, which is of course a federal practice, are factually and
legally complex. In 1998, Professor Nancy Rapoport urged that the time
had come to create a federal law of bankruptcy ethics, arguing
persuasively that the state-based norms offer little guidance for the
particular issues that arise in bankruptcy practice.150 Although formal
national rules have yet to be adopted through the Rules Enabling Act,
the bankruptcy courts have looked more widely than just state rules of
conduct to analyze norms of conduct in bankruptcy practice.151 And the
power to control fees has given bankruptcy judges an enormous power
to make bankruptcy lawyers pay attention to what courts say is

148. See generally McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5; Judith A. McMorrow,
The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58
SMU L. REV. 3 (2005).
149. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at §§ 805.01–.07; see also FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 11, at 294–308.
150. Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of
Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 46–50 (1998); Nancy B. Rapoport,
The Intractable Problem of Bankruptcy Ethics: Square Peg, Round Hole, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 977, 982–85 (2002).
151. See, e.g., Rossana v. Momot, 395 B.R. 697, 701 n.4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008)
(stating that a court may look beyond the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct to “consider
other relevant authorities, such as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, the actual Model Rules and their related commentaries”).
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appropriate behavior.152 The net effect is that federal bankruptcy courts
are the dominant regulators in this area.
D. Treaty Obligations, International Practice, and
Technology Pressures
The shift of regulation has moved beyond simply federal legislative,
agency, or court regulation of attorneys. As many other commentators
have noted, the hydraulic pressure on legal practice from both expanded
technology and the global economy has shifted the focus to international
practice. U.S. law firms are expanding abroad, and foreign firms and
foreign legal consultants are coming to the United States to advise their
clients.153 This internationalization is not limited to large firms. Solo
and small firm practitioners are often needed to address the legal
problems of the growing U.S. immigrant community. Some of those
problems involve cross-border concerns—movement of property,
inheritance, marriage, child custody, and other issues that have international
dimensions. This again creates pressure to look to national norms to
adapt to these pressures.
The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was formed in 2009 to review
the “U.S. system of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in
technology and global legal practice developments.”154 Many of the
questions that arise from the cross-border practice will likely result in
recommendations on how states can reduce the barriers to cross-border
practice. Problems in multijurisdictional practice and the movement of
in-house counsel across both state and national borders are challenges
that cannot be contained by simply insisting that the world adjust to the
state-based model of regulation. Competition from international firms
for a worldwide market for legal services also pressures U.S. regulatory
structures to consider alternate models being adopted abroad.155

152. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees,
82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008); Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in
Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263 (2010).
153. A rich body of literature is emerging on this subject. See, e.g., Jayanth K.
Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57 (2010) (exploring why
the international trend toward cross border practice has not occurred in India). Related
problems occur from multijurisdictional practice in the United States. See generally Carol A.
Needham, Multijurisdictional Practice Regulations Governing Attorneys Conducting
a Transactional Practice, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331.
154. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: Statement from Co-Chairs, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/chairs.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
155. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values,
and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193 (2010) (providing
a historical review of the MDP debate in the United States and Canada).
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While states consider the implications of multijurisdictional practice
and tweak the state-based ethics rules, international norms are increasingly
being imposed on lawyers through treaty obligations. As Professor
Laurel Terry has observed, the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) raises significant questions about the application of generally
applicable treaty obligations to state-based legal regulation.156 The federal
government, through its treaty-making power, can sweep attorneys under
treaty obligations and instantly harmonize lawyer conduct to make the
obligations consistent with international norms. The legal profession
can anticipate more treaty-based obligations.
III. CONTEXTUALIZATION
This movement of the center of gravity in attorney regulation to
federal law and norms highlights several important trends, most anticipated
by Professor Zacharias. But as developed above, federal regulation has
not occurred via an express preemption of lawyer regulation by the
states. Such preemption could be both politically confrontational and
problematic in practice.157 But federal norms are seen as complementing
state regulation in those areas of unique federal interest. These areas of
substantive law and agency practice all have sharply defined federal
interest: SEC, immigration, patent and trademark, tax, social security,
among others. This method of complementing state-based regulation
becomes more significant because we have increased specialization in
legal practice, which results in increased expertise and regulation in
context.158
This contextualization is a net social good because it generally
addresses areas of attorney conduct that are neglected by state regulators.
Insufficient bar resources and efficiency concerns likely play a role in
this functional bar deference. There has been little hew and cry about
the expanding norms, as long as they do not directly contradict state core
values. For example, at the 2010 ABA National Conference on
Professional Responsibility, Bar Counsel for the District of Columbia

156. See Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and Its
Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989
(2001), revised in 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 1387 (2002).
157. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 11, at 27, 29.
158. See, e.g., REGAN JR., supra note 28, at 366.
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stated publicly that they welcome the actions of the federal agencies to
supplement state bar regulatory activities.159
As a practical matter the state bars lost the battle of predominant selfregulation, assuming it ever truly had a system of self-regulation.
Professor Zacharias noted that the bar continues to cling to the “myth of
self-regulation,” but functionally is a coregulator with these other
systems.160 Indeed, the desire to retain some role in self-regulation was
the impetus for the ABA 20/20 Commission.
This federalization and contextualization is creating some significant
challenges, but they are manageable issues. First is a question about
choice of law. If there is a direct conflict between federal and state
attorney regulation, the federal regulation will trump. But choice of law
norms become complicated when regulatory systems are layered, which
is often the case in attorney regulation. A lawyer practicing before the
Patent and Trademark Office may simultaneously be held to federal
agency, federal district court, and state court regulations—sometimes all
in direct conflict. Efforts to resolve these conflicts by incorporating
choice of law standards, such as ABA Model Rule 8.5, have had a
checkered history, in part because some states have resisted a uniform
conflicts rule.161 But when the Committee on Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States held a major conference to
explore Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct (FRAC), even representatives
of major national firms and the Department of Justice reported that, with
some relatively narrow exceptions, the contextualized system was
working, aided by some realistic court supervision.162
Ironically, another concern raised by contextualization has been
capture of the regulation by the regulated bar, especially in narrow
agency practice with “revolving doors.” Of course, purely state-based
self-regulation has long been criticized for unduly reflecting the selfinterest of the profession, at the expense of protecting the public.
Indeed, the argument can be made that contextualization reduces the
danger of capture by introducing a kind of “checks and balances” of
different regulatory realities on each other. Thus, the criminal defense
bar is traditionally strong in state-based regulatory systems, an influence
that led to concern by the United States Department of Justice whose
lawyers had to act across the country in regulatory systems that, in
159. Wallace E. “Gene” Shipp, Jr., D.C. Bar Counsel, Remarks at the Panel on
Prosecutions of Lawyers: Trends and Implications at the 36th ABA Nat’l Conference on
Prof’l Responsibility (June 3, 2010).
160. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
161. See Carla C. Ward, Comment, The Law of Choice: Implementation of ABA
Model Rule 8.5, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 173 (2005).
162. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 11, at 237–61.
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certain cases, the Department felt were unreasonable.163 But criminal
defense lawyers practicing in tax cases would face a different, national
context, which could balance out more local capture. There has been no
serious empirical study of the effect of contextualization on capture, and
anecdotal testimony during the FRAC Conference was inconclusive. It
is quite conceivable that a serious study would show development of
attorney regulation by federal contextualization was more protective of
the public interest than the traditional state system. In any event, these
concerns have not slowed the process itself.
IV. CONCLUSION: ZACHARIAS’S PROPHECY
As early as 1829, the great Justice Joseph Story predicted that the
combination of the new national law schools, the increased power of
federal courts and federal jurisprudence, and the influence of treaty
obligations and global trade would result in a truly national profession.
But powerful historical forces sent his vision the same way as his
landmark decision, Swift v. Tyson, for nearly two centuries.164
New historical forces, which Justice Story never dreamed of, have
now emerged: most particularly the new scope of federal judicial
rulemaking, the regulatory sweep of Congress over all professions, and
the vast expansion of federal regulatory agencies. Professor Zacharias
was the prophet who would first clearly see the implication of this new
world for the legal profession and for the American system of justice.
For this we are all in his debt.
But the prophecy has manifested itself in an unexpected way. The
political realities of entrenched state bars, often projecting themselves
through national bar associations, have made a direct upheaval of
professional regulation both unlikely and, perhaps, undesirable and
unnecessary. Contextualization of an ever increasingly specialized
federal bar has resulted in growing and effective regulation by the
combined incremental effects of congressional action, judicial rulemaking,
federal litigation ethics, and the overall influence of global and

163.
164.

Id. at 27–34.
See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN
OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 237–70 (1985); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD:
A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817–1967, at 92–139 (1967); Daniel R. Coquillette,
“Mourning Venice and Genoa”: Joseph Story, Legal Education, and the Lex Mercatoria,
in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW 11 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005).
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technological change. Thus, Zacharias’s Prophecy is coming true, but in
a way that uniquely reflects the conditions of a post-modern age.
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